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Inequality and poverty are complex and persistent phenomena, which fuel an
ongoing debate between governments and international organizations. At least
since the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the subsequent agreement
on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the international community
has emphasized its commitment to the reduction of inequality and poverty.
The negative consequences for human and economic development in terms of
deprivation, social unrest, lower investment, and ultimately lower growth point
to the need of appropriate national and international policies to ﬁght inequality
and poverty.1
Along with the concerns of the broad public the scientiﬁc community has
dedicated substantial eﬀorts to exploring the sources and the socio-economic
consequences of inequality and persistent disadvantages across generations.2
Scholars have developed various approaches to cope with the complexity and
diversity of these phenomena.3 Both policymakers and academics agree that
unequal access to resources and distribution of power are at the core of per-
petuating inequality and poverty. One strand of literature accordingly stresses
that ﬁnancial market imperfections prevent the poor from investing in produc-
tive assets. As a consequence, inherent disadvantages are transmitted across
generations, resulting in persistent inequality and poverty.
The idea of the ﬁnance-inequality-poverty nexus roots in the ﬁnance-growth
nexus, which has been discussed intensively in the economic literature. The-
oretical models stress that ﬁnancial development promotes economic growth
through mobilizing savings, evaluating prospective entrepreneurs, and diversi-
fying risks.4 These predictions are strongly supported by empirical evidence.5
The question whether all social classes beneﬁt equally from ﬁnancial de-
velopment was ﬁrst considered and theoretically investigated in the model by
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), which predicts an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between ﬁnancial development and income inequality. The models by
Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993) instead suggest that
inequality decreases linearly with increasing ﬁnancial development.6 These two
contradicting theories have been the subject of recent empirical studies. Clarke,
Xu and Zou (1996) and Liang (2006) explicitly test the hypotheses. While
Clarke, Xu and Zou provide weak evidence in favor of the inverted-U-shaped
hypothesis, both studies ﬁnd strong evidence for a linear relationship between
ﬁnancial development and income inequality. Li, Squire and Zou (1998) and
Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2007) take the linear relationship between
ﬁnance and inequality as given.
1Some studies show that there may also be a positive relationship between increasing
inequality and economic growth. See for example Forbes (2000).
2A description of the channels through which inequality aﬀects growth can be found in
Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996), among others.
3A comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature is given in Barro (2000)
and Easterly (2007).
4See Bencivenga and Smith (1991) or King and Levine (1993a), among others.
5See Levine (2004) for a detailed review of the ﬁnance-growth literature.
6A detailed summary of the theoretical models can be found in Liang (2006).
1Most studies use a rather narrow deﬁnition of ﬁnancial development, such
as the value of credit issued by ﬁnancial intermediaries to the private sector di-
vided by GDP.7 The main reason for the wide use of this measure in empirical
studies is its availability across countries and time (Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine,
2008). However, ﬁnancial development clearly has more dimensions. Expand-
ing the knowledge, we examine how diﬀerent aspects of ﬁnancial development
aﬀect income inequality and poverty looking at diﬀerent indicators of the ﬁnan-
cial and the stock market. The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial development on inequality and poverty, taking a broader
view of ﬁnancial development than in previous work. Both cross-country and
panel regression results show that inequality and poverty are reduced not only
through enhanced loan markets, but also through better developed stock mar-
kets. Since ﬁnancial development may be endogenous, we use legal origin and
the absolute value of the latitude of each country as instruments in a Two
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) analysis. The results reinforce our overall ﬁndings.
Given that developed and developing countries diﬀer substantially in terms of
institutional structures, political regimes and economic systems, we split the
sample and estimate the regressions for each income group separately. To the
best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper estimating the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
development in split sub-samples, i.e. taking into account the particular char-
acteristics of developed and developing countries. From this approach we gain
some interesting new insights: i) the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development becomes
rather weak particularly for developing countries, ii) government spending leads
to a reduction in income inequality only in high income countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the determinants of income inequality and poverty considered in the analysis.
Section 3 outlines the data and the empirical framework. Section 4 presents
the results. Section 5 draws conclusions and points to future research.
2 Determinants of inequality and poverty
2.1 Financial development
The determinant of inequality and poverty which is of major interest in this
paper is ﬁnancial development. There are basically two ways in which ﬁnance
can aﬀect inequality and poverty: ﬁrst, more agents - in particular the poor -
are directly involved in the economy via enhanced access to ﬁnancial services,
for example provided by microﬁnance institutes. Second, better investment op-
portunities for ﬁrms and entrepreneurs reach the poor indirectly - e.g. through
advanced economic performance, better employment opportunities etc. Hence,
a single measure such as the ratio of private credit to GDP can measure di-
rect access. It may be appropriate in developing countries, where saving and
lending is the key business in ﬁnancial intermediation. In emerging markets
and industrialized countries, however, ﬁnancial intermediation is more sophisti-
7See Clarke, Xu and Zou (2006), Liang (2006), and Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine
(2007).
2cated and therefore requires taking into account other dimensions of ”ﬁnance”,
in particular the stock market.
The literature which addresses the determinants of ﬁnancial development
provides a comprehensive review of the manifold dimensions of ﬁnance. E.g.,
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use private credit to GDP as a measure of ﬁnance
by the banking sector, and stock market capitalization to GDP as a measure
of equity ﬁnance. Baltagi et al. (2007) capture ﬁnancial development through
diﬀerent indicators of banking sector development (private credit, liquid liabil-
ities, domestic credit to GDP) and capital market development (stock value
traded, stock market turnover to GDP, number of companies listed). Girma
and Shortland (2004) use private sector credit to GDP, stock market capitaliza-
tion to GDP, and total stock market value traded divided by GDP to measure
ﬁnancial development. Herger, Hodler and Lobsiger (2007) use stock market
capitalization and private credit as ﬁnancial development measures.
In order to better understand how and to what extent ﬁnancial development
aﬀects income inequality and poverty, we include not only measures of the
banking sector’s development, but also control for stock market development.8
First, we use private credit to GDP as a measure of ﬁnancial development.
We use it in two diﬀerent ways: private credit1 denotes the value of private
credit issued by deposit money banks divided by GDP, private credit2 considers
credits issued by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial institutions. Second,
to control for stock market development, we use three common stock market
measures. Stock market capitalization to GDP is equal to the value of listed
shares and serves as a measure of relative stock market size. A bigger stock
market, i.e. a higher capitalization, is associated with better mobilization of
capital and better diversiﬁcation of risk and thus indicates an important aspect
of ﬁnancial development. Stock market total value traded to GDP represents a
common indicator of market liquidity and usually serves as a complementary
indicator to market capitalization. Stock market turnover ratio is the ratio
of the value of total shares traded to average real market capitalization and
also serves as a liquidity measure.9 In order to test for the joint development of
ﬁnancial and stock markets, we construct a composite index denoted as ﬁnance,
which equals the value of private credit plus market capitalization relative to
GDP. Finally, we use a composite measure of access to ﬁnancial services, which
measures the percentage of the adult population with access to an account with
a ﬁnancial intermediary (Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, Levine and Honohan, 2008).
2.2 Other determinants
It is obvious that inequality and poverty are not solely determined by ﬁnancial
development. We use a set of control variables which are motivated by the lit-
erature. First, we control for ethnic diversity which is known to be a common
determinant of inequality in the literature. It has been shown that countries
8Atje and Jovanovic (1993) as well as Levine and Zervos (1996) show that stock market
development has a positive eﬀect on economic growth. Hence, we test whether these positive
eﬀects are valid also for inequality and poverty.
9Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (1995).
3with higher ethnic diversity have more diﬃculties in providing public goods.10
There are basically two reasons for this conﬂict. On the one hand, diﬀerent
ethnic groups have diﬀerent preferences over which type of public good to pro-
duce with tax revenues. On the other hand, each ethnic group’s utility level for
a given public good is reduced if other groups also use it. Put diﬀerently, if tax
revenues are collected from one ethnic group and used to provide public goods
which also serve other ethnic groups, voters are likely to choose lower levels of
public good provision (Alesina et al., 1999). Also, an ethnic elite in power may
not want to invest in public goods like human capital, since this could raise
other groups’ political voices and enable them to replace the currently ruling
elite (Easterly, 2001). Hence, by impeding agreement about the provision of
public goods, we expect higher ethnic fractionalization to have an increasing
eﬀect on income inequality and poverty.
Second, we use the land gini index as a measure of the distribution of land.
This serves us in two ways. First, it is a common measure of the distribution
of wealth. Second, in most developing countries land serves as a collateral
for ﬁnancial services. Inequality in terms of land therefore prevents the poor
from making productive investments such as education, and ﬁnally results in
inequality of incomes. Using the initial distribution of land as a proxy for
the poor’s access to the ﬁnancial market, Li, Squire and Zou (1998) ﬁnd that
an increase in land inequality causes an increase in the disparity of incomes.
Deininger and Squire (1998) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of initial land
inequality on subsequent growth. In line with Li, Squire and Zou, they suggest
that the eﬀects of land inequality are transmitted through (imperfect) ﬁnancial
markets. They show that higher land inequality also has a negative eﬀect on
education. Hence, we expect a more equal distribution of land to be associated
with a broader access to the ﬁnancial market and thus a more equal distribution
of income.
Third, we control for the eﬀect of government spending. The allocation
of tax revenues can crucially determine the income distribution. Depending on
the particular redistribution eﬀorts made by the government, higher government
expenditure can either lead to a reduction in poverty and income inequality or to
an increase in income disparities. Cross country comparisons of gini coeﬃcients
before and after taxes suggest that developed countries achieve an improvement
in income distribution. Developing countries instead seem to lack appropriate
redistributive programs to reduce income inequality (Chu, Davoodi and Gupta,
2000). The expected eﬀect of government spending on inequality and poverty
is thus ambiguous.
Finally, we control for the eﬀect of human capital. While some theoret-
ical models stress that the relation between education and inequality is not
always clear, most empirical studies suggest that more education reduces in-
come inequality.11 A recent paper by Zhang (2007) maintains that persistent
inequality traces back to public education spending at diﬀerent levels. We hy-
pothesize that countries with better and broader access to education in general
10See Easterly (2001), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Alesina et al. (1999, 2003).
11See for example De Gregorio and Lee (2002).
4are expected to have less income inequality. We use secondary school enrollment
as the main education measure. We also test for average years of schooling, the
literacy rate, and the Human Development Index (HDI) as proxy variables for
education. Since the results do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly, we will not report them.
3 Data and empirical framework
Our sample contains data of 78 developing and developed countries for the
period 1960-2006.12 Since income inequality is a rather time-persistent phe-
nomenon, we argue that it is appropriate to use the Gini coeﬃcient in levels
instead of its rate of change.13 Gini data are taken from the UNU-WIDER
World Income Inequality Database WIID2b. Data on poverty are from the
World Bank’s poverty database (Povcalnet). The interesting explanatory vari-
able of income inequality and poverty in this paper is ﬁnancial development.
In a ﬁrst step, we examine whether the data predict a linear or an inverted
U-shaped relationship between ﬁnancial development and income inequality.
To do this, we estimate the following equation:
Yi,t = α + β1FDi,t + β2FD2
i,t + γXi,t + ǫi,t, (1)
where the dependent variable Yi,t refers to the Gini coeﬃcient measured
in levels and the headcount ratio of country i at time t, respectively. The
headcount ratio is equal to the percentage of the population living below the
poverty line. We set the poverty line at $2 per day. On the right hand side,
we use ﬁnancial development FDi,t as the main explanatory variable and a
set of control variables, represented by the vector Xi,t. Banerjee and Newman
(1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993) predict a linear relationship, i.e. β1 < 0 and
β2 = 0. The model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) supposes an inverted
U-shaped relationship between ﬁnancial development and income inequality,
i.e. β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. To save space we do not report the results of these
preliminary estimations. Our ﬁndings clearly support the linear hypothesis,
so that from now on we use the linear equation. However, we slightly modify
the regression equation by introducing an interaction term between ﬁnancial
development and a developing-country-dummy variable to check if the eﬀect
of ﬁnancial development diﬀers signiﬁcantly between developing and developed
countries. The modiﬁed equation takes the following form:
Ginii,t = α + β1FDi,t + β2FDi,t ∗ DVi + γXi,t + ǫi,t (2)
The control variables Xi,t include measures of ethnic diversity, the distribution
of land, government spending and education. Data on land distribution are
12Number of countries per income group: low income: 12, lower middle income: 22, upper
middle income: 17, high income OECD: 23, high income non-OECD: 4.
13According to Li, Squire and Zou (1998) 91.8% of the variance in countries’ inequality -
measured by the Gini coeﬃcient - is cross-country variance, whereas only 0.85% is variance
over time. Similar evidence is found by Bruno et al. (1996).
5taken from FAO statistics and Erickson and Vollrath (2004).14 Data on eth-
nic fractionalization are taken from Alesina et al. (2003). They are available
for single years, only. According to Alesina et al. (1999, 2003), however, eth-
nic fragmentation does not change substantially over a time span of 30 years.
Drawing on this conclusion, we apply the available measure on ethnic fraction-
alization for the entire time span of 40 years. Data on government spending
and education are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(WDI). Financial data are taken from Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2000)
and Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, Levine and Honohan (2008). Summing up, we estimate
the following equation:
Ginii,t = α + β1 ∗ financei,t + β2 ∗ financei,t ∗ dummyi + γ1 ∗ educi,t
+γ2 ∗ landi,t + γ3 ∗ ethnici,t + γ4 ∗ govexpi,t + ǫi,t
The following equation is used for poverty estimations:
Headcounti,t = α + β1 ∗ financei,t + γ1 ∗ educi,t
+γ2 ∗ landi,t + γ3 ∗ ethnici,t + γ4 ∗ govexpi,t + γ5 ∗ inflation + ǫi,t
Similar to above, we control for the eﬀects of ethnic diversity, the distribution
of land and government spending. Following the literature, we also examine
the eﬀects of inﬂation on the poor.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables.15 It becomes
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Gini coeﬃcient (gini) 0.407 0.11 0.199 0.733 514
Headcount ratio ($2) (headcount) 0.356 0.282 0 0.981 182
Private credit/GDP* (priv cred1) 0.414 0.351 0.014 2.072 641
Private credit/GDP*(priv cred2) 0.469 0.388 0.014 2.649 643
Market capitalization/GDP (market cap) 0.429 0.49 0 2.824 351
Total value traded/GDP (val traded) 0.235 0.402 0 2.407 350
Turnover ratio (turnover) 0.43 0.505 0.001 3.716 345
Joint ﬁnance measure (ﬁnance) 0.481 0.403 0.03 2.034 336
Financial access (ﬁn access) 0.529 0.293 0.05 1 740
Ethnic fractionalization (ethnic) 0.408 0.256 0.012 0.930 770
Land gini (lagini) 0.653 0.168 0.247 0.930 600
Government expenditure/GDP (gov exp) 14.548 5.037 4.013 32.844 710
Inﬂation (inﬂ) 38.307 232.24 -0.524 3357.608 690
Secondary enrollment (sec enrtot) 68.64 25.403 7.796 99.992 183
Average years of schooling (avg schooling) 6.666 2.504 1.873 12.049 268
Literacy rate (lit tot) 79.076 18 26.869 99.747 102
Human Development Index (hdi) 0.735 0.16 0.321 0.968 506
Notes: Variables descriptions are given in the Appendix.
* While priv cred1 includes private credit issued only by deposit money banks, priv cred2
accounts also for credit from other ﬁnancial institutions.
evident that there are large variations in the data. Regarding income inequality,
the sample contains countries with Gini coeﬃcients ranging from around 20% to
14Land distribution data are available for one or up to three years, at most. According to
the data, land distribution does not change signiﬁcantly over time. We therefore take the
mean value of land distribution and apply it to the entire time period.
15Due to missing data the number of observations shrinks drastically for education measures
and headcount ratio.
6over 70%. The headcount ratio varies between 0% for transition countries and
98% for Uganda. Similarly, we observe large variations in the control variables
as well as in all ﬁnance measures. While in Nicaragua only 5% of the population
have access to ﬁnancial services, it is nearly 100% for several industrialized
economies. The correlation matrix conﬁrms all expected relations. In the next
section, we present the results. We ﬁrst run cross-country regressions, using
the data averaged over the entire time span. In a second step, we use ﬁve-year
averages to run panel regressions.
4 Results
We ﬁrst present and discuss the results using standard OLS. Then we turn to
the results of 2SLS regressions.
4.1 Inequality
Cross Country estimations
Table 2 displays the results of the cross-country regressions using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS). According to eq. (2), we include an interaction term
between the ﬁnance variable and a developing dummy variable which is equal
to one for developing countries and zero otherwise. We note that all measures of
ﬁnancial development turn out negative and signiﬁcant, implying that ﬁnancial
development has a negative eﬀect on income inequality. However, the positive
and in most cases statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of the interaction term
suggest that the marginal eﬀect of ﬁnancial development is higher for developed
countries. Although private credit to GDP turns out to have the strongest eﬀect
on inequality, the impact of stock market development is only slightly weaker.
An increase of private credit to GDP by one percentage point for example
decreases the Gini coeﬃcient by 0.1. A one percentage point increase in market
capitalization relative to GDP leads to a decrease in the Gini coeﬃcient by 0.09.
As mentioned earlier, we also use a direct measure of access to ﬁnance. These
ﬁndings are given in table A.2 in the appendix. The results imply a very strong
eﬀect: an increase in the percentage of the population with access to ﬁnance
by one percent could lower the Gini by 0.2.
The estimated coeﬃcients on ethnic division turn out positive and signiﬁcant
across all regressions, implying that countries where a large number of diﬀerent
ethnic groups live together have to deal with higher income inequality. This
conﬁrms the evidence found in other empirical studies, which states that regions
with large ethnic fragmentation have more diﬃculty in providing public goods
like schooling and infrastructure. The lack of speciﬁc public goods like education
ﬁnally leads to an increase in income inequality. However, without further
details we cannot determine the channels through which the eﬀect of higher
ethnic division increases income inequality.
The coeﬃcient on land distribution is positive and signiﬁcant and implies
that an increase of the land Gini by 1 unit increases the income Gini by 0.18.
Hence, more inequality in terms of land causes more inequality in terms of in-
7come. Whether this conﬁrms the hypothesis that land is an important collateral
to get access to ﬁnancial services and therefore higher land inequality inevitably
leads to higher income inequality, or if it just reﬂects the fact that inequality
in incomes usually comes along with inequality in land cannot be determined
without further analysis. Finally, the coeﬃcients on government spending are
negative but statistically insigniﬁcant.
Table 2: Inequality: Cross-country estimations


























ethnic 0.0709** 0.0756** 0.107*** 0.129*** 0.106** 0.0856**
(0.0348) (0.0354) (0.0379) (0.0410) (0.0425) (0.0367)
lagini 0.174*** 0.172*** 0.181*** 0.220*** 0.195*** 0.177**
(0.0501) (0.0512) (0.0583) (0.0628) (0.0631) (0.0559)
gov exp -0.00270 -0.00294 -0.00360 -0.00456 -0.00449 -0.00287
(0.00247) (0.00255) (0.00273) (0.00287) (0.00305) (0.00263)
Constant 0.336*** 0.331*** 0.330*** 0.301*** 0.344*** 0.333***
(0.0603) (0.0609) (0.0654) (0.0726) (0.0763) (0.0631)
No. of observations 59 59 53 52 52 53
R2 0.665 0.651 0.642 0.578 0.591 0.671
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In additional estimations we also control for education, using secondary school
enrollment as the education measure. The results can be found in table A.3.
8We use secondary school enrollment . Two aspects stand out, immediately.
First, the coeﬃcients of most ﬁnance variables become insigniﬁcant. Second,
the signiﬁcance of ethnic fragmentation vanishes, too. At ﬁrst sight, this seems
to suggest that the estimated eﬀects of ﬁnance and ethnic division are not
robust. However, there might be a plausible explanation for these eﬀects. As
already mentioned, diﬀerent studies have shown that ethnic fragmentation plays
a central role in the public goods problem. Easterly et al. (1999) use data for
diﬀerent urban US localities, cities, metropolitan areas and counties to show
that the share of spending on education is signiﬁcantly lowered by higher ethnic
division.
The reason why the eﬀect of ethnic division disappears might therefore be
the rather strong correlation of (-0.674) between ethnicity and secondary school
enrollment. If we look at the correlations matrix, we ﬁnd even higher correla-
tions between secondary school enrollment and ﬁnance. While the correlation
with stock market development of (0.27) is at the lower end, the correlation
coeﬃcients with ﬁnancial access and private credit are about (0.61) and (0.78),
respectively. The reason for this strong relation can be found in the theoretical
literature, where the presence of ﬁnancial market imperfections restricts mostly
poor people from making investments in human capital, which ﬁnally leads to
an increase in inequality.
Panel estimations
The panel data regressions are estimated with random eﬀects, since land gini
and ethnicity are time persistent. As before, we ﬁrst look at the results with-
out controlling for education. The results are presented in table 3. Similar to
the cross-country observations, the ﬁndings suggest that ﬁnancial development
leads to a reduction in income inequality. Of the stock market measures, only
market capitalization is signiﬁcant. Again, access to ﬁnancial services has a
strong and highly signiﬁcant inequality-decreasing eﬀect.16 Table A.4 displays
the results when we additionally control for education. With more observa-
tions, and thus more detailed information than in the cross country estimation,
we ﬁnd more robust eﬀects of ﬁnancial development when controlling for edu-
cation. While the signiﬁcance of stock market development clearly diminishes,
the eﬀects of private credit as well as access to ﬁnance remain highly signiﬁcant.
The same holds for the eﬀect of ethnic fragmentation, which is robust across
all regressions. Based on these speciﬁcation, between 60−70% of cross country
variance can be explained.
In sum, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence that ﬁnancial development reduces in-
come inequality, which again can spur economic growth. The ﬁndings of most
previous studies have been primarily based upon a rather narrow deﬁnition
of ﬁnancial development. An important result is therefore that these ﬁndings
generally also apply for stock market development. We have shown that stock
market development - compared to the ratio of private credit to GDP - has a
lower, yet signiﬁcant eﬀect on income inequality. The channel through which
16See the appendix, table A.2.
9stock market development lowers income inequality is a priori not entirely clear.
Previous studies suggest that larger stock markets beneﬁt mainly large and ma-
ture ﬁrms. Through enhanced investment opportunities, they can expand and
eventually oﬀer better employment opportunities, resulting in lower inequality.
Table 3: Inequality: Panel estimations


























ethnic 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.131*** 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.107***
(0.0317) (0.0322) (0.0344) (0.0373) (0.0385) (0.0341)
lagini 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.287*** 0.320*** 0.318*** 0.273***
(0.0482) (0.0490) (0.0530) (0.0570) (0.0582) (0.0520)
gov exp -0.00334*** -0.00370*** -0.00158 -0.00142 -0.00142 -0.000936
(0.000968) (0.000960) (0.00123) (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.00126)
Constant 0.312*** 0.315*** 0.198*** 0.162*** 0.169*** 0.208***
(0.0392) (0.0397) (0.0456) (0.0483) (0.0490) (0.0456)
No. of observations 366 367 206 203 202 200
R2 overall 0.542 0.536 0.567 0.474 0.462 0.615
R2 between 0.603 0.591 0.609 0.528 0.522 0.658
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In order to get an idea of the economic signiﬁcance of our results, we compute
standardized (beta) coeﬃcients, which measure the amount of change of the
dependent variable in standard deviations caused by a one standard deviation
10change in the explaining variable. They are given in table 4. It becomes evident
that the ﬁnance variables are not only statistically signiﬁcant, but in most cases
also economically relevant. Stock market development has an economically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on income inequality. In the cross country sample, the eﬀect
of stock market development in terms of higher stock market capitalization is
even stronger (0.36) than traditional credit market development (0.29).
Table 4: Standardized coeﬃcients
Coeﬃcient Inequality Inequality Poverty Poverty
Cross country Panel Cross country Panel
priv credit1 -0.294 -0.172 -0.472 -0.310
priv credit2 -0.256 -0.151 -0.529 -0.325
market cap -0.366 -0.134 -0.227 -0.199
val traded -0.231 -0.027 -0.254 -0.226
turnover -0.344 -0.067 0.050 -0.088
ﬁnance -0.344 -0.172 -0.328 -0.269
ﬁn access -0.574 -0.415 -0.652 -0.702
ethnic 0.173 0.235 0.300 0.336
lagini 0.279 0.289 -0.387 -0.278
gov exp -0.106 -0.152 -0.188 0.006
inﬂ 0.166 -0.031
Notes: Reported coeﬃcients on ethnic, lagini, gov exp, and inﬂ
are calculated in each case upon the results from regression (1).
Two-Stage-Least-Squares
So far, we have made the implicit assumption that ﬁnancial development is an
exogenous regressor. If it is not, however, OLS provides biased estimators. In
the ﬁnance-growth literature there is a considerable debate about the exogenous
component(s) of ﬁnancial development. Beck et al. (2003a) empirically eval-
uate two theories about the historical determinants of ﬁnancial development.
The law and ﬁnance theory holds that historically determined diﬀerences in
legal origin can explain cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development.17
The endowment theory claims that during colonial history the geographical en-
dowment of a region determined whether Europeans formed settler colonies or
created extractive states, which in turn deﬁned the institutional environment.
In temperate areas favoring the cultivation of grains and hays colonizers set up
institutions that support private property, while in more tropical environments
favoring more high-yield crops and with abundant minerals institutions were
built that empower the elite and extract resources.18 Beck et al. (2003a) ap-
ply the endowment theory to the development of the ﬁnancial system. Their
results show that endowment, measured by settler mortality and the absolute
value of the latitude of each country, are more robustly associated with ﬁnancial
intermediary development than legal origin. Following, we use measures of the
legal origin and latitude separately as instruments for ﬁnancial development
17British Common law is usually said to stress private property rights and thus fosters
ﬁnancial development, whereas French Civil law is said to be less conducive to ﬁnancial de-
velopment. For more details see La Porta et al. (1998) and Levine et al. (2000), amongst
others.
18See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000).
11to estimate the eﬀect of the exogenous component of ﬁnancial development on
inequality, based on the two distinct theories described above.19
We ﬁrst use legal origin as instrument for ﬁnancial development. In the
cross-country regression, most estimators of the ﬁnance variables get smaller
and insigniﬁcant. In the panel regression, most estimators increase by size, but
again are insigniﬁcant.20 The results of the 2SLS analysis using latitude as an
instrument are given in the appendix (tables A.5 and A.6). It becomes evident
that compared to OLS all estimators are signiﬁcant at the 10% level, and the
eﬀects are clearly stronger.21 From the results we can draw two major con-
clusions. First, the results from the Two Stage Least Square analysis strongly
support the ﬁndings using OLS, implying that ﬁnancial development eﬀectively
can help decrease income inequality. Second, our results imply that latitude
is a stronger instrument for ﬁnancial development than legal origin providing
support for the endowment theory as in Beck et al. (2003a).
So far, we have considered the eﬀects of ﬁnancial development on the gini
coeﬃcient, i.e. the entire distribution of income. We ﬁnd evidence that ﬁ-
nancial development leads to a signiﬁcant decrease in income inequality and
thus support the results found in previous studies. However, we do not know
what happens to the poor, which are located at the very low end of the income
distribution. In the next section we thus turn to the question whether ﬁnan-
cial development is not only pro-equality but pro-poor, and examine the direct
eﬀects of ﬁnancial development on poverty.
4.2 Poverty
In the long run, economic growth helps to reduce poverty. Financial develop-
ment can therefore reduce poverty indirectly through enhanced growth. In the
previous sections we have shown that ﬁnancial development can also reduce
income inequality. However, we do not know if it beneﬁts the poor directly. In
many poverty models, persistent ﬁnancial market imperfections are core deter-
minants of poverty.22 These imperfections raise the constraints which keep the
poor from investing in education, health and entrepreneurial activities. In this
regard, ﬁnancial development can help to attain the Millennium Development
Goals. Contrary to the common opinion that the poor are mainly served by
expanded ﬁnancial access tailored to their needs (e.g. via microﬁnance ser-
vices), there is evidence suggesting that the focus should be on the expansion
of ”ﬁnance for all”. Broad ﬁnancial development might improve the investment
opportunities of large and mature ﬁrms and thus enhance overall growth and
19Clarke, Xu and Zou (2006) use legal origin data as instruments for ﬁnancial development.
Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2007) use legal origin and latitude together to instrument
for ﬁnancial development.
20Since most results turn out insigniﬁcant, they are not reported, here.
21Note that we checked the correlations between the ﬁnance variables and both instruments,
legal origin and latitude. We ﬁnd that latitude is clearly more correlated with all ﬁnance vari-
ables than legal origin. Legal origin appears to be a weak instrument and therefore introduces
a downward bias into the results.
22See Demirg¨ uc-Kunt (2008) for a review of this literature.
12employment opportunities of the poor.23 Jalilian and Kirkpatrick (2002), Hon-
ohan (2004) and Beck et al. (2007) show empirically that ﬁnancial development
can contribute to poverty alleviation. The results of the poverty estimations
Table 5: Poverty: Cross-country estimations
















ethnic 0.320** 0.322** 0.313** 0.325* 0.322* 0.301** 0.276*
(0.144) (0.143) (0.150) (0.158) (0.160) (0.145) (0.142)
lagini -0.630*** -0.599** -0.572** -0.630** -0.554* -0.574** -0.604***
(0.221) (0.220) (0.241) (0.253) (0.274) (0.234) (0.215)
gov exp -0.0125 -0.00885 -0.0206 -0.0263* -0.0253* -0.0183 -0.0198
(0.0133) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0130) (0.0120)
inﬂ 0.000366* 0.000339 -0.000202 -0.000145 -0.000166 -0.000212 0.000262
(0.000214) (0.000214) (0.000369) (0.000379) (0.000391) (0.000360) (0.000215)
Constant 0.920*** 0.870*** 0.905*** 0.982*** 0.891** 0.922*** 1.101***
(0.265) (0.263) (0.279) (0.290) (0.331) (0.269) (0.267)
No. of observations 36 36 31 30 30 31 36
R2 0.491 0.500 0.440 0.425 0.412 0.468 0.522
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
are presented in tables 5 and 6. It becomes evident that ﬁnancial development
has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on poverty. The fact that developing countries
rely mostly on the banking sector, in particular on the market for loans, is con-
ﬁrmed by our results: the estimated coeﬃcient on priv credit is amongst the
highest. It states that an increase in private credit to GDP leads to a reduction
in poverty by 0.2 to 0.5%. Even more remarkable is the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access
on poverty: one percent more people having access to ﬁnancial services lowers
the headcount ratio by around 0.6%. However, the results from the panel regres-
sions show that ﬁnancial development beyond credit markets can lower poverty,
too. All stock market measures turn out negative and signiﬁcant. The size of
the eﬀect is clearly smaller than for the credit market, indicating that the stock
market is less important, yet signiﬁcant for poverty alleviation. This suggests
23Demirg¨ uc-Kunt, Levine and Honohan (2008).
13that sophisticated ﬁnancial systems that may primarily serve entrepreneurs can
contribute to poverty alleviation.
Rather unexpected is that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on poverty
is not only signiﬁcant, but clearly higher than for income inequality.24 This
becomes clear when comparing the standardized coeﬃcients in table 4. As be-
Table 6: Poverty: Panel estimations
















ethnic 0.370** 0.381*** 0.328** 0.326** 0.317** 0.311** 0.293**
(0.148) (0.145) (0.144) (0.155) (0.156) (0.143) (0.144)
lagini -0.468** -0.462** -0.525** -0.556** -0.564** -0.543*** -0.469**
(0.213) (0.210) (0.212) (0.222) (0.223) (0.210) (0.202)
gov exp 0.00336 0.00389 -0.000880 -0.00238 -0.00282 0.000667 0.00106
(0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00310) (0.00319) (0.00330) (0.00338) (0.00305)
inﬂ -0.0000385 -0.0000348 -0.0000678** -0.0000527* -0.0000462 -0.0000632** -0.0000316
(0.0000267) (0.0000266) (0.0000320) (0.0000316) (0.0000323) (0.0000321) (0.0000283)
Constant 0.565*** 0.555*** 0.600*** 0.624*** 0.640*** 0.625*** 0.790***
(0.193) (0.190) (0.187) (0.200) (0.201) (0.186) (0.207)
No. of observations 129 129 104 101 101 102 131
R2 overall 0.363 0.389 0.358 0.325 0.272 0.379 0.376
R2 between 0.387 0.418 0.407 0.375 0.334 0.423 0.464
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
fore, the coeﬃcients imply that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on poverty is
economically relevant. The coeﬃcient on ﬁnancial access shows that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in ﬁnancial access leads to a decrease in the headcount
ratio by 0.7 standard deviations. This implies that poverty can be signiﬁcantly
alleviated by securing access to ﬁnancial services.
As we mentioned in the introduction, there is an important caveat. Our re-
sults are all based on a sample consisting of developing and developed countries.
Intuitively, one could argue that the process of ﬁnancial development depends
24As before, the size of the eﬀect of ﬁnance on poverty as well as of the other explanatory
variables and their signiﬁcance decline drastically when we control for education. See the
appendix, tables A.7 and A.8.
14crucially on the state of development as well as on fundamental diﬀerences we
have not yet controlled for. In order to better allow for such possible diﬀerences
among the two groups of developing and developed countries, we estimate our
general equation for high and low income countries separately. All results can
be found in the appendix.25 We ﬁnd weak evidence for an inequality-decreasing
eﬀect of ﬁnancial development in high income countries. In low income coun-
tries, the eﬀect vanishes totally or even changes the sign, implying that ﬁnancial
development leads to an increase in income inequality. Ethnic fractionalization
is no longer signiﬁcant. Finally, the eﬀect of government spending on income in-
equality is negative for high income countries, implying that higher government
expenditures lead to a signiﬁcant decrease in income inequality. The opposite
is true for developing countries, where we get a positive, though in most cases
insigniﬁcant, coeﬃcient.
There are basically two possible reasons why most eﬀects might disappear
when we split the sample. First, it could tell us that in fact there may be no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on income inequality. In this case
the evidence we obtain using the entire sample would be based on statistical
inaccuracy. Second, the signiﬁcance may vanish due to too limited variance in
the data within the sub-samples.
In a last step, we estimate the equation using the entire sample, but ad-
ditionally include the developing country dummy separately. The results are
given in the tables A.13 and A.14. The ﬁndings are very similar to those of
the split sample. In a few cases, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of ﬁ-
nancial development on inequality. As before, ethnic fractionalization becomes
insigniﬁcant, and government spending is signiﬁcant only in very few cases.
Hence, the general conclusion that ﬁnancial development decreases income
inequality and poverty should be treated with caution. Several open question
remain and require additional research. The overall signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
developing country dummy implies that there are considerable diﬀerences be-
tween developed and developing countries that have not been considered in past
research.
5 Conclusions
Given the negative consequences of income inequality and poverty for human
and economic development, there is an ongoing lively debate on particular poli-
cies to ﬁght inequality and poverty. Using several measures of the ﬁnancial
and the stock market to examine the robustness of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial de-
velopment on income inequality and poverty, we have shown that stock market
development - compared to credit market development - clearly has a lower, yet
signiﬁcant eﬀect on income inequality and poverty. This is a major result. It
supports our view that ﬁnancial development aﬀects the poor not only through
enhanced loan markets, but also through developed stock markets. Surpris-
ingly, the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on poverty is not only signiﬁcant, but
also clearly higher than on income inequality. Both the identiﬁcation of the
25See tables A.9-A.12.
15particular channels through which ﬁnancial development aﬀects inequality and
the poor and the set up of implications for particular policies are left for future
research.
We have also shown that ethnic fractionalization is a signiﬁcant and robust
determinant of both income inequality and poverty. This conﬁrms the results
found in other studies which suggest that countries with higher ethnic diversity
are likely to have more diﬃculties in providing public goods. The lack of public
goods like education then perpetuates income inequality.26 Our results strongly
support the notion that education is a key to widespread welfare. Another
persistent and robust determinant of income inequality is the distribution of
land. More inequality in terms of land ownership is signiﬁcantly associated
with higher inequality of incomes. A priori, the eﬀect of higher government
expenditure is not clear-cut, but depends crucially on redistributive eﬀects. In
most speciﬁcations government expenditure enters negatively yet insigniﬁcantly.
However, within diﬀerent income groups there is weak evidence suggesting that
higher government expenditure leads to a reduction in income inequality in
high income countries. In low income countries however, we ﬁnd a positive but
insigniﬁcant eﬀect.
Finally, we have pointed to some critical aspects regarding the sample se-
lection. A closer look at sub-samples shows that the link between ﬁnancial de-
velopment and inequality particularly for developing countries is rather weak.
However, we do not question the importance of ﬁnancial development for eco-
nomic welfare.
So far, we know little about the channels through which ﬁnancial develop-
ment aﬀects inequality and poverty. Future research will hopefully shed light
on these aspects. Hence, promoting ﬁnancial development by appropriate poli-
cies at best forms one of many steps which can help to reduce inequality and
poverty.
26According to our results education leads to a strong and signiﬁcant reduction in income
inequality when we omit ethnicity.
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20Appendix
Table A.1: Variables and sources
Variable Deﬁnition Sources
gini Gini coeﬃcient, 1960-2006 UNU Wider World Income Inequality Database
headcount Headcount ratio ($2), 1980- World Bank, PovcalNet
priv cred1 Private credit/GDP, 1960-2006 Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2000)
(credit issued by deposit money banks)
priv cred2 Private credit/GDP, 1960-2006 Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2000)
(credit issued by deposit money banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions)
market cap Market capitalization, 1960-2006 Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2000)
val traded Total value traded/GDP, 1960-2006 Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2000)
turnover Turnover ratio, 1960-2006 Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2000)
ﬁnance Joint ﬁnance measure, 1960-2006 Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2000),
ﬁn access Percentage of population with access Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Honohan (2007),
to ﬁnancial services
ethnic Ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003)
lagini Land Gini, 1970, 1980, 1990 FAO statistics, Erickson and Vollrath (2004)
gov exp Government ﬁnal consumption expenditure/GDP, World Bank
1960-2006
inﬂ Inﬂation, 1960-2006 World Bank
sec enrtot School enrollment, secondary, 1960-2006 World Bank
avg schooling Average years of schooling of adults (15+), World Bank
1960-2006
lit tot Literacy rate (% of people 15+), 1960-2006 World Bank
hdi Human Development Index, 1975-2005 UNDP
legal Legal origin Beck, Demirg¨ uc-Kunt and Levine (2003b)
lat Absolute value of the latitude La Porta et al. (1998)
Table A.2: Composite measure of ﬁnancial access
Dep. var.: 1 2 3 4
Gini
ﬁn access -0.205*** -0.152*** -0.156*** -0.166***
(0.0360) (0.0553) (0.0331) (0.0402)
ﬁnacc dum 0.118** 0.147*** 0.0830* 0.174***
(0.0447) (0.0472) (0.0435) (0.0537)
ethnic 0.0424 0.0239 0.0374 0.0393
(0.0333) (0.0346) (0.0332) (0.0326)
lagini 0.165*** 0.175*** 0.137*** 0.195***
(0.0474) (0.0492) (0.0469) (0.0498)
gov exp 0.00330 0.00292 -0.00284*** 0.00240*
(0.00264) (0.00268) (0.000963) (0.00146)
sec enrtot -0.000535 -0.000161
(0.000611) (0.000273)
Constant 0.340*** 0.349*** 0.428*** 0.311***
(0.0595) (0.0608) (0.0480) (0.0509)
Sample Cross country Cross country Panel Panel
No. of observations 56 51 376 89
R2 0.730 0.749
R2 overall 0.560 0.821
R2 between 0.679 0.807
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
21Table A.3: Inequality: Cross-country (with education)


























ethnic 0.0240 0.0223 0.0418 0.0493 0.0505 0.0343
(0.0355) (0.0359) (0.0378) (0.0428) (0.0426) (0.0367)
lagini 0.196*** 0.200*** 0.191*** 0.230*** 0.209*** 0.189***
(0.0487) (0.0492) (0.0517) (0.0566) (0.0591) (0.0513)
gov exp -0.000678 -0.000604 -0.000798 -0.000890 -0.00155 -0.000815
(0.00261) (0.00261) (0.00268) (0.00299) (0.00312) (0.00264)
sec enrtot -0.00123** -0.00142*** -0.00153*** -0.00175*** -0.00161** -0.00142**
(0.000520) (0.000528) (0.000527) (0.000594) (0.000618) (0.000549)
Constant 0.373*** 0.371*** 0.404*** 0.384*** 0.412*** 0.398
(0.0599) (0.0598) (0.0614) (0.0699) (0.0753) (0.0602)
No. of observations 54 54 49 48 48 49
R2 0.719 0.715 0.737 0.676 0.663 0.744
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
sjdhjhsdsCO2
22Table A.4: Inequality: Panel (with education)


























ethnic 0.0864** 0.0881** 0.110*** 0.127*** 0.135*** 0.106***
(0.0367) (0.0378) (0.0386) (0.0436) (0.0435) (0.0372)
lagini 0.267*** 0.275*** 0.288*** 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.271***
(0.0539) (0.0553) (0.0533) (0.0606) (0.0616) (0.0520)
gov exp -0.0000454 -0.0000252 -0.000609 -0.000518 -0.00104 -0.000659
(0.00154) (0.00159) (0.00160) (0.00175) (0.00170) (0.00156)
sec enrtot -0.000419 -0.000497* -0.000647** -0.000650* -0.000492 -0.000474
(0.000292) (0.000300) (0.000308) (0.000337) (0.000325) (0.000303)
Constant 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.226*** 0.204*** 0.198*** 0.230***
(0.0495) (0.0510) (0.0501) (0.0552) (0.0557) (0.0489)
No. of observations 94 94 87 86 85 87
R2 overall 0.762 0.753 0.754 0.669 0.661 0.776
R2 between 0.713 0.706 0.711 0.630 0.622 0.736
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
23Table A.5: Inequality: Cross-country (2SLS)






























ethnic 0.00654 0.0124 0.0997** 0.0925 -0.00454 0.0680 0.00552
(0.0540) (0.0544) (0.0443) (0.0607) (0.0785) (0.0427) (0.0406)
lagini 0.133* 0.129* 0.135* 0.145 0.0991 0.139** 0.147***
(0.0681) (0.0703) (0.0708) (0.0956) (0.1000) (0.0662) (0.0522)
gov exp 0.00140 0.00228 0.000217 -0.00101 0.000469 0.000442 0.00675**
(0.00373) (0.00409) (0.00358) (0.00439) (0.00489) (0.00338) (0.00336)
Constant 0.417*** 0.404*** 0.343*** 0.363*** 0.447*** 0.360*** 0.382***
(0.0868) (0.0868) (0.0766) (0.107) (0.118) (0.0731) (0.0680)
No. of observations 59 59 53 52 52 53 56
R2 0.427 0.389 0.513 0.139 0.167 0.572 0.683
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
24Table A.6: Inequality: Panel (2SLS)






























ethnic 0.0119 0.0154 0.0839 0.0722 -0.0383 0.0367 0.00537
(0.0659) (0.0678) (0.0623) (0.130) (0.169) (0.0532) (0.0419)
lagini 0.122 0.117 0.166 0.210 0.179 0.173** 0.113**
(0.0848) (0.0892) (0.103) (0.195) (0.197) (0.0802) (0.0544)
gov exp 0.000801 0.0000686 0.000215 -0.000815 0.00239 0.00119 -0.00267***
(0.00225) (0.00213) (0.00191) (0.00311) (0.00328) (0.00170) (0.000989)
Constant 0.386*** 0.397*** 0.318*** 0.311* 0.364* 0.320*** 0.502***
(0.0704) (0.0746) (0.0904) (0.181) (0.193) (0.0736) (0.0685)
No. of observations 366 367 206 203 202 200 376
R2 overall 0.462 0.449 0.447 0.260 0.302 0.549 0.541
R2 between 0.590 0.580 0.541 0.396 0.433 0.616 0.668
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
25Table A.7: Poverty: Cross-country (including education)
















ethnic 0.249* 0.251* 0.253* 0.265 0.243 0.255* 0.254*
(0.135) (0.134) (0.144) (0.156) (0.154) (0.141) (0.127)
lagini -0.410* -0.404* -0.441* -0.482* -0.454* -0.449* -0.414**
(0.210) (0.208) (0.221) (0.233) (0.250) (0.219) (0.197)
gov exp -0.00697 -0.00592 -0.0128 -0.0156 -0.0155 -0.0121 -0.00898
(0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0130) (0.0122) (0.0110)
sec enrtot -0.00529** -0.00520** -0.00378* -0.00362 -0.00414* -0.00338 -0.00337
(0.00191) (0.00194) (0.00206) (0.00222) (0.00209) (0.00214) (0.00206)
inﬂ 0.000436** 0.000427** 0.0000641 0.0000817 0.000120 0.0000323 0.000303
(0.000190) (0.000192) (0.000357) (0.000359) (0.000364) (0.000357) (0.000195)
Constant 0.876*** 0.861*** 0.888*** 0.929*** 0.932*** 0.887*** 0.957***
(0.252) (0.252) (0.272) (0.276) (0.309) (0.264) (0.242)
No. of observations 33 33 29 28 28 29 33
R2 0.601 0.602 0.534 0.530 0.521 0.542 0.643
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
26Table A.8: Poverty: Panel (including education)
















ethnic 0.431** 0.435*** 0.413*** 0.439*** 0.414** 0.399*** 0.357***
(0.167) (0.161) (0.143) (0.164) (0.164) (0.141) (0.125)
lagini -0.350 -0.358 -0.514** -0.569** -0.523** -0.512** -0.303
(0.247) (0.239) (0.205) (0.227) (0.232) (0.205) (0.185)
gov exp 0.0101 0.00919 0.00507 0.00596 0.00757 0.00557 0.00901
(0.00646) (0.00650) (0.00626) (0.00666) (0.00656) (0.00620) (0.00561)
sec enrtot -0.00155 -0.00151 -0.000523 -0.000652 -0.000984 -0.000587 -0.000967
(0.00142) (0.00146) (0.00151) (0.00160) (0.00153) (0.00148) (0.00128)
inﬂ -0.00000797 -0.00000881 0.00000411 0.0000101 0.00000368 0.00000667 0.00000969
(0.0000587) (0.0000604) (0.0000606) (0.0000637) (0.0000630) (0.0000605) (0.0000542)
Constant 0.397* 0.414* 0.492** 0.484** 0.443** 0.509*** 0.705***
(0.232) (0.225) (0.196) (0.210) (0.220) (0.196) (0.185)
No. of observations 48 48 41 39 39 41 48
Number of country code 28 28 23 21 21 23 28
R2 overall 0.460 0.497 0.539 0.489 0.466 0.549 0.674
R2 between 0.485 0.509 0.629 0.584 0.558 0.640 0.706
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
27Table A.9: Inequality: Cross-country: high income countries
















ethnic 0.0179 0.0182 0.0422 0.00687 0.0112 0.0400 0.0392
(0.0453) (0.0493) (0.0547) (0.0507) (0.0496) (0.0501) (0.0434)
lagini 0.156** 0.163** 0.121* 0.144** 0.144** 0.122* 0.111*
(0.0580) (0.0634) (0.0654) (0.0657) (0.0652) (0.0626) (0.0558)
gov exp -0.00731** -0.00580* -0.00513 -0.00439 -0.00426 -0.00601* -0.000414
(0.00303) (0.00323) (0.00300) (0.00317) (0.00310) (0.00303) (0.00310)
Constant 0.406*** 0.344*** 0.355*** 0.312*** 0.302*** 0.387*** 0.489***
(0.0817) (0.0888) (0.0740) (0.0740) (0.0753) (0.0791) (0.0805)
No. of observations 23 23 22 22 22 22 20
R2 0.510 0.424 0.367 0.311 0.317 0.401 0.637
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
28Table A.10: Inequality: Cross-country: low income countries
















ethnic 0.0683 0.0686 0.0807 0.105* 0.0996* 0.0800 0.0576
(0.0481) (0.0480) (0.0529) (0.0522) (0.0502) (0.0526) (0.0485)
lagini 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.247*** 0.253*** 0.219** 0.247*** 0.203***
(0.0701) (0.0701) (0.0807) (0.0794) (0.0800) (0.0805) (0.0692)
gov exp 0.00722 0.00722 0.00800 0.00808* 0.00605 0.00793 0.00713*
(0.00429) (0.00443) (0.00476) (0.00430) (0.00434) (0.00480) (0.00398)
Constant 0.225** 0.224** 0.177* 0.159 0.220** 0.178* 0.253***
(0.0853) (0.0851) (0.0978) (0.0949) (0.102) (0.0967) (0.0896)
No. of observations 36 36 31 30 30 31 36
R2 0.248 0.248 0.298 0.360 0.407 0.297 0.268
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
29Table A.11: Inequality: Panel: high income countries
















ethnic 0.00690 0.00651 0.0107 -0.000890 0.00407 0.00722 -0.00604
(0.0382) (0.0425) (0.0410) (0.0403) (0.0395) (0.0396) (0.0434)
lagini 0.130*** 0.131** 0.135** 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.137*** 0.123**
(0.0487) (0.0541) (0.0537) (0.0533) (0.0524) (0.0521) (0.0580)
gov exp -0.00886*** -0.00932*** -0.00380** -0.00317* -0.00373** -0.00386** -0.00946***
(0.00122) (0.00125) (0.00181) (0.00183) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00130)
Constant 0.424*** 0.427*** 0.304*** 0.287*** 0.292*** 0.307*** 0.487***
(0.0370) (0.0400) (0.0492) (0.0489) (0.0476) (0.0489) (0.0845)
No. of observations 161 161 85 86 85 85 143
R2 overall 0.388 0.350 0.366 0.347 0.374 0.379 0.353
R2 between 0.505 0.443 0.446 0.435 0.459 0.464 0.480
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
30Table A.12: Inequality: Panel: low income countries
















ethnic 0.0620 0.0613 0.0490 0.0670 0.0641 0.0419 0.0539
(0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0502) (0.0503) (0.0509) (0.0506) (0.0481)
lagini 0.178*** 0.176** 0.275*** 0.297*** 0.281*** 0.274*** 0.169**
(0.0686) (0.0687) (0.0724) (0.0709) (0.0721) (0.0730) (0.0674)
gov exp 0.000879 0.000611 0.00215 0.00204 0.00172 0.00276 0.000664
(0.00131) (0.00130) (0.00161) (0.00162) (0.00158) (0.00168) (0.00127)
Constant 0.309*** 0.314*** 0.230*** 0.212*** 0.237*** 0.219*** 0.354***
(0.0636) (0.0634) (0.0661) (0.0660) (0.0672) (0.0668) (0.0699)
No. of observations 205 206 121 117 117 115 233
R2 overall 0.138 0.138 0.332 0.302 0.298 0.345 0.122
R2 between 0.182 0.179 0.358 0.399 0.397 0.364 0.197
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
31Table A.13: Inequality: Cross-country with developing dummy






























ethnic 0.0545 0.0545 0.0582 0.0633 0.0652* 0.0573 0.0502
(0.0351) (0.0353) (0.0391) (0.0383) (0.0360) (0.0384) (0.0340)
lagini 0.175*** 0.177*** 0.175*** 0.180*** 0.158*** 0.176*** 0.163***
(0.0490) (0.0493) (0.0543) (0.0544) (0.0526) (0.0542) (0.0474)
gov exp 0.000120 0.000542 0.000597 0.00154 0.000437 0.000277 0.00405
(0.00286) (0.00289) (0.00293) (0.00284) (0.00271) (0.00300) (0.00273)
dummy dev 0.0930* 0.119** 0.107*** 0.137*** 0.160*** 0.0942* -0.105
(0.0502) (0.0524) (0.0375) (0.0322) (0.0335) (0.0476) (0.0990)
Constant 0.236*** 0.201** 0.216*** 0.173** 0.193*** 0.229*** 0.427***
(0.0801) (0.0820) (0.0730) (0.0689) (0.0704) (0.0804) (0.101)
No. of observations 59 59 53 52 52 53 56
R2 0.686 0.683 0.696 0.699 0.729 0.697 0.736
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
32Table A.14: Inequality: Panel with developing dummy






























ethnic 0.0419 0.0420 0.0290 0.0330 0.0347 0.0249 0.0404
(0.0347) (0.0350) (0.0347) (0.0352) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0339)
lagini 0.148*** 0.146*** 0.211*** 0.220*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.136***
(0.0478) (0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0486) (0.0485) (0.0490) (0.0469)
gov exp -0.00286*** -0.00316*** 0.000787 0.000798 0.000480 0.00118 -0.00280***
(0.000962) (0.000957) (0.00122) (0.00122) (0.00119) (0.00126) (0.000969)
dummy dev 0.0766*** 0.0779*** 0.132*** 0.141*** 0.150*** 0.127*** -0.0418
(0.0217) (0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0212) (0.0217) (0.0246) (0.0999)
Constant 0.309*** 0.311*** 0.169*** 0.157*** 0.165*** 0.163*** 0.466***
(0.0378) (0.0381) (0.0413) (0.0410) (0.0409) (0.0432) (0.103)
No. of observations 366 367 206 203 202 200 376
R2 overall 0.587 0.582 0.680 0.668 0.674 0.683 0.562
R2 between 0.660 0.652 0.745 0.743 0.751 0.740 0.681
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*, **, *** Statistically signiﬁcant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
33Table A13: Cross-correlation table
Variables gini headcount priv cred1 priv cred2 market cap val traded turnover ﬁnance ﬁn access ethnic lagini gov exp inﬂ
gini 1.000
headcount 0.206 1.000
priv credit1 -0.372 -0.298 1.000
priv credit2 -0.355 -0.316 0.935 1.000
market cap -0.185 -0.180 0.626 0.664 1.000
val traded -0.204 -0.033 0.572 0.646 0.694 1.000
turnover -0.345 0.109 0.327 0.371 0.209 0.643 1.000
ﬁnance -0.291 -0.234 0.880 0.866 0.921 0.714 0.303 1.000
ﬁn access -0.579 -0.482 0.619 0.629 0.454 0.431 0.303 0.618 1.000
ethnic 0.458 0.454 -0.315 -0.317 -0.057 -0.173 -0.267 -0.197 -0.525 1.000
lagini 0.446 -0.412 -0.184 -0.189 -0.204 -0.220 -0.266 -0.241 -0.295 0.022 1.000
gov exp -0.404 -0.165 0.313 0.360 0.231 0.173 0.066 0.292 0.422 -0.235 -0.263 1.000
inﬂ 0.063 -0.087 -0.107 -0.108 -0.128 -0.094 -0.024 -0.145 -0.141 0.062 0.121 0.050 1.000
sec enrtot -0.700 -0.727 0.612 0.632 0.451 0.407 0.274 0.575 0.786 -0.674 -0.207 0.500 -0.190 1.000
avg schooling -0.558 -0.559 0.542 0.618 0.424 0.435 0.260 0.496 0.739 -0.471 -0.125 0.379 -0.142 0.807
lit tot -0.031 -0.498 0.302 0.306 0.238 -0.003 -0.272 0.274 0.470 -0.391 0.653 0.004 0.056
hdi -0.492 -0.803 0.617 0.641 0.426 0.416 0.269 0.577 0.781 -0.592 0.063 0.301 -0.060
3
4Table A13: Cross-correlation table
Variables sec enrtot avg schooling lit tot hdi
sec enrtot 1.000
avg schooling 0.807 1.000
lit tot 0.694 0.803 1.000
hdi 0.901 0.842 0.852 1.000
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